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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
 
 
ANGEL FRALEY, et al. 
 Plaintiffs, 
 v. 
 
FACEBOOK, INC., 
  
  Defendant. 
____________________________________/
 No. C 11-1726 RS 
 
 
ORDER DENYING OBJECTOR’S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND INCENTIVE AWARD  
 
 
Objector Sam Katzman, represented by attorney Theodore H. Frank of the Center for Class 
Action Fairness, seeks an award of attorney fees and an individual incentive payment, based on his 
contention that his objections resulted in a substantial benefit to class members.  Katzman claims a 
fee award of $135,000, together with an incentive award of $500, both to be paid out of class 
counsel’s fee recovery.  Katzman suggests that to avoid the appearance of any “unseemly windfall,” 
he recover only $50,000 in fees, with the balance of the award to be added to the class recovery.1  
Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the motion has been submitted without oral argument.  The 
motion will be denied. 
Generally, objectors may be entitled to fees upon a showing that they “substantially 
enhanced the benefits to the class under the settlement,” by increasing the size of the fund or 
                                                 
1 As the existing settlement fund is sufficient to pay all the cash claims, any additional monies 
would be distributed to the cy pres recipients, rather than directly to class members. 
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otherwise. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051-52. (9th Cir. 2002).  Here, Katzman 
contends his objections led or at least contributed to both (1) an increase in the cash payment each 
class member who submits a valid claim will receive from $10 to $15, and (2) a fee award to class 
counsel being made in an amount approximately $2.8 million less than requested. 
Katzman’s assertion that it is “likely” the cash payments were increased in response to his 
objection is not supported by the record.  The settlement agreement always contemplated such an 
increase in the event the number of claims made was low enough to permit it. There is nothing from 
which it can reasonably be inferred that Katzman’s discussion of the principle that distributions to 
class members are generally preferable to cy pres distributions led to the parties exercising, and this 
court ordering, that option under the settlement agreement, once the number of claims made became 
known.   Indeed, Katzman’s objection did not even address the most salient issue, discussed in the 
final approval order: the need to balance the advantages of larger payments to class members against 
the potential unfairness to those who elected not to submit claims, believing only $10 payments 
were likely. Thus, not only did Katzman’s objection play no role in the increased payments, his 
arguments did not adequately address the propriety of making such an award in the first instance. 
Katzman’s claim that his objections reduced the fee award by approximately $2.8 million is 
also not borne out by the record.  First, the $7.5 million fee request was predicated on plaintiff’s 
contention that a dollar value could and should be assigned to the injunctive relief for purposes of 
calculating a percentage-based fee award.  As reflected in the order denying preliminary approval of 
the first settlement proposal, the question of whether the value of injunctive relief could be 
quantified in the manner proposed by plaintiffs and used to support a fee award was of great concern 
long before Katzman appeared in this matter.  That plaintiffs ultimately were not able answer the 
previously-expressed concerns was not the result of Katzman having echoed them in his objections. 
Second, Katzman contends he was the only person who advocated for calculating the fee 
award from the net settlement fund, after deduction of expenses.  While it may be that this particular 
issue had not previously been raised by the Court, and was not addressed by the parties or other 
objectors, it does not support a fee award.  It may sometimes be appropriate to award fees where an 
objector advances a point not previously made by other parties or objectors even if the Court would 
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have sua sponte reached the same conclusion.  This is because “objectors must decide whether to 
object without knowing what objections may be moot because they have already occurred to the 
judge.”  Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 288 (7th Cir. 2002).  Nevertheless, the 
threshold requirements remain that the objectors must “contribute materially to the proceeding” and 
“produce an improvement in the settlement worth more than the fee they are seeking.”  Id.   
Here, applying the percentage recovery to the net settlement fund decreased the fee award by 
slightly less than $300,000, an amount which will now instead go to the cy pres recipients.  While 
not a de minimus amount, it represents a very small percentage of the overall settlement funds going 
either to class members directly or cy pres recipients.   
It is only commonsense that a percentage-based fee should be based on the amount actually 
recovered by the class (directly or through cy pres) and not include a percentage of the sums going 
to pay costs.  Even though Katzman may have been the only litigant to articulate this point, his 
objection did not rise to the level of a material contribution warranting a fee award.2 
Finally, Katzman’s reliance on Rodriguez v. West Pub. Corp., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) 
to argue he is entitled to fees as a matter of law is misplaced.  Contrary to Katzman’s insistence, 
Rodriguez did not hold it is “clearly erroneous” to deny an objector’s fee request on grounds the 
objector “did not add anything” to the result.  (Reply Brief at 4:9-11.)   Rather, the court merely held 
that the record in that case demonstrated that the objections had, as a factual matter, affected the trial 
court’s analysis and resulted in a benefit to the class.  563 F.3d at 963.  The record here does not 
support a similar conclusion.  The motion for a fee award and an incentive award is denied. 
 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
                                                 
2   Even if the increase of less than $300,000 in the amount going to cy pres recipients could be 
deemed a material contribution provided by Katzman, the associated reasonable fee for preparing 
what amounted to one paragraph of his objection would be de minimus. 
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Dated:  2/27/14 
RICHARD SEEBORG 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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